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sink-me
The Reds Aren't Stallin'!
Russia is Moving Ahead Fast in the Development of an Atomic Age Air Force. Here
are the Latest Soviet Fighters and Bombing Planes
By James L. H. Peck
The American people were told by their leaders nearly a year ago that the Soviets
were out-building us twelve-to-one in military aircraft. Outside the military and
the aviation industry - both of which have been accused of wanting to start another
war - the significance of the warning did not register the way it was expected to,
if at all.
Now the disparity is put at fifteen-to-one. To this sobering news - coming at
a time when our new USAF and Navy air forces are just beginning to take shape on
the production lines - is added the completely reliable information that out of
the busy Russian plants are flowing jet fighters comparable to the best of ours.
Jet bombers and piston-engined, long-range bombing planes are in operational service.
Moreover, it is now conceded in military quarters that the Red scientists have
held atomic tests and should require only a little time to get into production a
compact A-bomb.
But this bad news, coupled with Russian behavior in Berlin and the Paris UN sessions,
is an ill wind that blows at least some good i our direction. We won't make the
same disastrous mistake of underestimating a potential enemy that we did once before.
Enough intelligence has been gleaned in bits and pieces through cracks in the
Iron Curtain to show clearly that if the efforts of statesmen fail, here is what
the U. S. and the nations of Western Union would be up against tomorrow:
A Red Air Force of about 15,000 first-line aircraft, including some 2,400 jet
planes, which at this writing are in operational service. The jets include a long-range
"frontier" fighter; four interceptor models, two of which boast a generous range;
a "storm" plane for tactical operations; and a four-jet bomber. As the accompanying
illustrations reveal, these airplanes are of a thoroughly modern design that indicates
research activity of the highest order.
This is indicated, also, in the now-admitted fact that the Soviets penetrated
the sonic barrier at least three months before our X-1 did the trick in October,
1947.
Turbojet development of equally high caliber is evidenced in the big power plants
now in production for these aircraft and others. Among those known to exist are
the widely-used 4,000-pound-thrust Chelomey engine, a 6,000-pound version of the
same make, and a copied British Rolls Royce Nene rated at 5,000 pounds thrust. Moreover,
they have made successful tests with a more powerful turbojet that features the
new annular burner and is reported to develop between 7,500-8,000 pounds of thrust.
This effort parallels advanced American and British jet research.
The always-excellent Russian ordnance is in evidence in the armament of the new
craft, and there are reliable reports to the effect that along with the power plants
and airframes of our B-29, the Soviets also successfully pirated our RCT fire-control
system.
"Absolute weapon" activity is known to be wide-spread, with extensive research
in guided missiles and a few of the more weird projects Nazi scientists didn't have
time to finish before V-E Day.
This state of the Soviet Union is not quite so surprising to U. S. intelligence
agencies - nor so recently come by - as the lay public might understandably believe
at first hearing. Russian interest in jets, for example, dates along with American
efforts, and appears to have been equally independent of German influence in the
earlier days.
Russian Cast of Characters
Chief, Red Air Force: Deputy Minister of Armed Forces Konstantin
Vershinin
Leading atomic scientist: Dr. Peter Kapitza
Leading aircraft designers: Tupolev, Yakolev, Ilyushin, Mikoyan,
Gurevich, Lavochkin, Sukhoi
Promising new aero designers: Bratokin, Scherbakov
Leading designers who are deceased, but whose works may still influence
current design: Petlyakov, Polikarpov
• High-speed research jet plane.
• Single-jet fighter by Mikoyan.
• MIG 7, interceptor with twin jets.
To understand better how this state of aerial eminence came about, we look back
to 1942 when the Soviets began the development of what they called a "reaction engine."
The then leading jet expert, Andrei Kostikoff, was given carte blanche the following
year by the Scientific Motor Institute (ZAIM), at Stalin's intercedence. By 1944,
a hand-built YAK prototype was flying as far afield as Germany. This jet fighter
performed well enough to survive several combats with Luftwaffe jets over the Berlin
area.
As the Red Army rolled forward towards the German capital in 1945, its mop-up
squads were followed closely by secret police (MVD) units with a very special mission.
This involved the recruiting of ex-scientists, technicians, and skilled workers
- aeronautical and otherwise. Willing Germans were offered good homes, liberal wages,
and extra rations: as an added inducement, they might even bring along their families.
American Military Government officials have since estimated that at least 50 Percent
of the skilled workers in the Russian zone accepted; more than a few were persuaded
to quit the U.S. and British and French zones before we started our own campaign
to recruit German scientists. The plans, tools, and facilities that the Reds shipped
home along with these erstwhile enemies constituted the richest prize the Russian
government could have captured.
• Tupolev jet bomber, with two German Jumo engines.
• Lo 8 fighter. Span 48' 4", speed 610 mph.
This involves the story, now well-circulated in intelligence circles, of the
famous "two trains from Peene-muende." It seems that the Germans did not move as
much equipment from this scientific center as we believed, following the destructive
bombing raids of August, 1944. (They did move the great V-2 plant to an underground
site near Nordhausen, but U.S. authorities later turned this over to the Russians
anyway.) Valuable rocket test equipment and other gadgets, plans, and workers were
loaded onto two trains for transfer to the USSR. They never got there, say folks
with connections in the Polish underground.
• Interceptor, designation unknown.
• The Utka utility plane, 145 hp .
• Single-jet Yak 15, interceptor.
Less doubtful is the fact that a lot of wind tunnels and valuable apparatus did
reach Russia ; the Reds were able to get to many of the best spots before ALSOS
representatives and other U.S. technical intelligence teams arrived.
For the most part, these transplanted scientists were settled in a new center
24 miles from Moscow, under the watchful eye of Marshal Lavrenti Berea, MVD chief.
The site was placed under the over-all jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Defense.
A nearby air-drome at Ramenskoye was greatly enlarged and beautifully equipped as
a flight test center, after the fashion of our Muroc base, under the direction of
the very highly regarded Central Institute of Aero Hydrodynamics (VAIM) .
The Russians took possession of the German DFS-346 supersonic research plane
together with technical staff responsible for its construction. At the time they
took it the DFS-346 was almost completed and ready to fly. The ship had three sets
of wings built for it, one set straight, one with 20° sweep back and one with
45° sweepback. It had the most elaborate telemetering equipment ever installed
in a research plane which left the pilot only with the task of flying. He did not
even have to take down notes on a knee pad or remember any particular instance of
flight, for the Askania telemetering device took it all down and relayed it to ground
observers as well as photographed an elaborate instrument panel.
• Bomber version of Tu 170. Existence not certain.
• Ilyushin four-jet bomber (remote-control turrets?)
In view of the fact that the Russians had the 346 long before our XS-1 was completed,
it is very possible that this was the ship they flew at supersonic speeds before
us. The Germans believed that the 346 could reach the speed of Mach 2.5 at altitudes
in the region of 75,000 feet.
The real significance of all this is not so much the fact that Red research is
a good five years ahead of schedule because of the contributions of German brains
and equipment; but that such marked progress has been made because they were far
enough advanced on their own to take immediate advantage of the most advanced German
ideas. The Soviets were able to take the Jumo 004-H and BMW-003 turbojets and develop
them further, without starting at the beginning and learning the ABC's of jet propulsion.
Their scientists could continue - not start - atomic experimentation, because they
already had some of the world's ranking nuclear physicists and a couple of the most
powerful cyclotrons in existence. They were able to go right on with the experiments
on the A-9 and A-10 (winged V-2) rockets and other missiles because of earlier rocket
savvy. Russians used them as anti-tank and artillery weapons before the Germans
ever did.
If, by U.S. and British shop standards, we considered Russian airframe workmanship
crude, albeit sturdy, they were certainly given enough of our equipment under lend-lease
to learn how to build beautiful, efficient airplanes. (Among the samples of our
best work were the P-39K and L, P-47D-30, P-63A, A-20C and K, and the B-25G and
H models. We sent more than 10,000 such planes, including some 700 twin-engined
transports to put the USSR in the airline business.)
The rumors of postwar progress started late in 1946; but the first real evidence
came by way of Finland. Early in the spring of 1947' came a Soviet claim of a new
world speed record of 660.7 miles per hour, and this was followed shortly by the
appearance of what was obviously a hand-built model of the LA-9. Finnish observers
were permitted to climb all over the ship and construction details were discussed,
ostensibly for propaganda motives. Then news that they didn't sponsor filtered out
of Czechoslovakia. American and other observers were .permitted to witness a quick
fly-by of about 100 jets of six types during the. May Day and Aviation Day (August
3) demonstrations of 1947. And information about the copied B-29 bomber was confirmed
by its public debut.
Soon afterward came more intelligence about their first supersonic flight. Our
original skepticism was changed by more reliable intelligence that seemed to corroborate
the information. The Red press made a big splash of the news that a jet had flown
over Moscow on May Day, 1948, at the speed of sound. And by that time, too, we had
learned that several of the planes seen in tile exhibitions of the year before were
in production.
In the meantime, our friend Kostikoff seems to have lost his identity as an individual,
since the Soviet turbojets on which there is any information bear the name of Chelomey
or are known to be British exports. Whether this is the name of a new "trust" or
another individual is a moot question. What appears to have happened is that the
Russian and German engineers combined the best features of their own turbojet with
those of the Jumo BMW designs to produce the Chelomey engines. Their progress is
most significant, because of the cumulative effect of a number of little things
rather than one or two revolutionary innovations.
Their largest production turbojet, for example, the 6,000-pound-thrust Chelomey,
is reported to be equipped with variable-pitch stators in its compressor assembly.
If this is true, they are further along than we are. U.S. researchers have been
working another angle - that of varying the pitch of the rotors instead of the stators.
Since it would appear simpler to control the movement of stationary parts than ones
which revolve at high speeds, the Soviet engineers would appear to be on firm ground.
Their engines feature the annular combustion chamber which was probably developed
from that of the German BMW turbojet. The annular burner - currently under development
and being produced by Westinghouse in the US. and Metrovick in England - is considered
more efficient than the separate burner "cans" because the former keeps interior
air turbulence to a minimum and thereby stabilizes combustion. Reports of parabolic
blade design and gimmicks such as the "surge inhibitor" indicate sound thinking
on the problems of internal aerodynamics, whether or not these items have been perfected.
What is being done in the USSR with their imported British turbojets is the cause
of some speculation. Original contracts were negotiated with Rolls Royce in January,
1946, but the final shipment on the order of 55 Nene and Derwent V engines was not
made until January, 1948. Pressure was put on Rolls by the British Board of Trade
to stop export; but the question remains of whether or not the Soviet engineers
have been able to duplicate the engine for production. Reports persist that the
latest YAK-17 models are Nene-powered. Moreover they are supposed to be fitted with
afterburners, as are some of the Chelomey turbojet installations. (This is significant,
if true. Afterburning is still under experiment in the U.S., and the first two planes
to use the device are just starting into production.)
In the power range between the Nene and the big Chelomey is the most popular
Red turbojet, the 4,000-pound thrust power plant used in theMIG-7 and -9, YAK-15,the
Tupolev storm plane, and perhaps others. Water injection has been tried, but it
is not known whether or not this is being used operationally.
On the upperend, of the Russians' power scale, the only project about which anything
is known is a big 13-stage Chelomey engine which has been reported test-flown at
between 7,500-8,000 pounds thrust.
Airframe progress follows the trend of engine development: sound thinking about
a collection of small items, rather than any single sensational gimmick. At least
one production model, the LA-9, features "sandwich" wing construction: thin sheets
of deskaba, or Russian duraluminum, sandwiched between them a layer of plywood.
Only a shade heavier than a comparable all-metal structure, these wings are claimed
to be much stronger, more rigid to stretching and bending stresses, and considerably
more bullet-resistant. They are reported to hold intact after being riddled with
machine gun fire. This construction parallels the "Metalite" balsa-metal sandwich
developed here by Chance Vought.
Something new for the Soviets is the use of shoulder wing locations on the Ilyushin
four-jet bomber, a new fighter designed by either Gurevich or Mikoyan, and the Tupolev
storm plane. Whether or not any better visibility results - and it might - this
wing mounting was apparently used on the storm plane for that purpose, on the fighter
to make room for the power plant, and on the bomber to allow space for wheel retraction
and continuous bomb bay area.
Rather conventional planform is evidenced in the wing structures, with air-foils
of thin, laminar-flow section. With one exception, there is little evidence of pronounced
sweepback or droop "cathedral" growing into popularity here and well developed by
the Germans. The interesting exception is the Red supersonic research job.
At least three versions of this plane flew, and there are reports
that a couple of less-successful models crashed in the attempt. The supersonic job
is thought to be the combination of the German DSF-346 airframe - almost completed
at home - and the Chelomey jet. One modification features straight-through airflow
and the other, well-designed side intakes. (The latter are not so flush as the NACA
inlets being tested on an experimental F-80, nor so protruding as the intakes on
Britain's Attacker jet.) The third is believed to be rocket-powered with a larger
version of the Walter HWK-509 engine. This ship was probably the first one through
the sonic barrier. One of its more marked features is the T-tail, with the stabilizer
mounted on top of the sweptback fin.
The story is around that the Soviets believed - as did some American and German
scientists - that transonic speeds could be reached most easily by a plane with
a sweptwing configuration. They are supposed to have worked exclusively in this
direction, putting up with some delay and accident in the course of their research.
Had they been certain the barrier could be crossed with a straight-winged plane
- as we proved with the X-1 a little later on - the Reds, so the story goes, might
have turned the trick months sooner than they did.
Armament of the planes in service includes cannon and machine guns in varying
combinations; but one cannon and two machine guns seem to be the popular arms equipment.
(By U.S. standards, this is light armament, notwithstanding the fact that Red ordnance
is known to be excellent and perhaps superior to our cannon models.) The Soviets
have the war-proven V-JA 32-mm cannon, used so tellingly on the Stormoviks, and
known for its armor-punching ability. The long-barreled V-JA 37-mm is a recent development
and is claimed to be one of several new hypervelocity arms. Their SH-VAK 20-mm gun
is widely used in combination with the Beresin VBK machine gun of 12.7 mm. Russian
ordnance men and engineers are supposed to have copied our RCT fire-control system,
but there is conflicting information about the extent of its use in the big Tupolev
bombers now in service. Some bombers are said to have the central turret system,
others use flexibly mounted guns instead.
The designation of these heavy bombers is not revealed, but the transport design
is called the TU-70, It accommodates 70 passengers, or 100 airborne troops less
comfortably, in the pressurized cabin. Tupolev used the 141-foot B-29 wing just
as he found it, but added 20 feet to the length of the fuselage and altered the
nose lines. Getting both the transport and bomber versions into production simultaneously
must have indeed amounted to a major triumph in USSR aero circles. It is well known
how they placed orders with an American company for B-29 wheel assemblies and had
this wheel deal scotched at the last minute by USAF procurement officers. It has
been suggested that they might have been having trouble making the wheel and brake
assemblies, or even in producing the big tires, but this is not suggested by the
time element. They might have ordered much sooner. Moreover, experts say that there
are more difficult things about the B-29 than the wheels.
Indeed, there are several puzzling aspects surrounding the Soviet production
picture. At the war's end they were operating 35 known plants for the output of
airframes and engines. About 750,000 workers were employed in these plants, with
probably another 50,000 making more indirect contributions. The best Russian figure
was some 40,000 planes in the 1944-45 year; but in airframe weight this was estimated
as only 20 percent of U.S. airframe capacity.
Our military leaders revealed some time ago that the Reds were geared to produce
between 75,000 and 100,000 planes per year. There is the feeling now that this estimate
may have been rather high, notwithstanding the supervision of some of the top Nazi
industrial planners, the marriage of some of the Russian trusts to the German combines,
and the added facilities in the Ural and Vladivostok regions. Experts say that if
Soviet production gets anywhere near the 100,000 mark, it means. that she has found
enough new sources of primary aluminum to double her known sources: either that
or she has made some startling metallurgical advances that permit the use of some
other secondary metal, with the pure aluminum used only for sweetening.
As far as is known, production follows closely the system used during the war.
The top agency-similar in function to our Munitions Board - is the Commissariat
of Defense. Immediately under this is the War Aircraft Trust with its widespread
system of sub-contracting and tie-in with German and Czech plants which were not
moved to the USSR. All aircraft accessories are produced through trusts or chain
factories. For instance, the Rubber Trust turns out tires, fuel cells, de-icers,
and fittings. Radios, wiring, lights, magnetos, and other items are turned out through
the Electro Trust. Gun sights and instruments are the responsibility of the Fine
Mechanics Trust. Ordnance, along with ammunition, is produced by the Arms Trust.
For the training of personnel such as supervisors and foremen, an Academy of
Aircraft Industry was established early in 1947. Russian manpower is one of its
strongest assets, and perhaps they figure that if we could teach housewives how
to build airplanes in a couple of weeks, so can they produce a local facsimile of
"Rosie the Riveter." The size of the plants themselves is something we are trying
to find out. The largest known factory is the one at Gorki, with better than 1,350,000
sq. feet devoted to final assembly. This compares in size with the Curtiss-Wright
plant in Columbus, Ohio.
The rapid expansion of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, is significant because it
shows their awareness of air lift as a substitute for their notably poor communications
on the surface. In August, 1947, route mileage was placed at 93,000. Latest information
puts Aeroflot holdings at 137,400 miles, and the Soviets have just recently started
scheduled night flights over these airways.
But in the case of both airlines and air forces, the qualitative factors usually
outweigh the numerical ones, particularly in the operational sense. The question
of the relative effectiveness in combat of the Red Air Force. against the USAF-Navy
team is outside the scope of this review, but some consideration must be given the
uses to which the Russian planes and other items discussed here might be put.
Composition usually provides good clues as to intents and purposes. The best
information here suggests that Red Air Force make-up closely follows upon its wartime
organization. There were sixteen units, roughly comparable to the numbered air forces
of our AAF. Each of these consisted of an Army-Cooperation Corps and Heavy Air Corps.
The former was composed of a brigade (three wings) of fighters, of storm planes,
and of reconnaissance and general-purpose-aircraft. Two bomber brigades and one
parachute brigade constituted a Heavy Air Corps. Special fighter wings were used
for "protective support" missions of a roving nature.
By AAF and RAF standards, the heavy Red air units demonstrated poor operational
savvy. Their maximum-effort raids involved about 200 bombers on visits to Berlin
and targets along the Baltic and in Rumania and Hungary. The Red air crews got hits;
but they seemed to get them the hard way, being continually hampered by poor communications
and coordination. This is the inspiration for the opinion of some USAF officers
that the Soviet strategic bombing know-how is highly questionable. Others, however,
feel that they must have gained much from AAF techniques and from the contributions
of German radio and radar experts; and that with plenty of B-29's to play around
with they should be learning fast. The Russian tac outfits were as good as the heavy
units were poor, largely because they held a greater need for storm tactics and
worked harder at them.
When Chief Marshal Alexander Novikov took over command of the air force in 1942,
he made this observation in an official organ: "We must, of necessity, commit the
air force to the close support of ground troops. We need planes which will affect
the military situation immediately: fighters to destroy the enemy bombers and fighters,
and storm planes to destroy the tanks, guns, and communications. There is not the
time for anything else. We have long-range bombers (TB-7) but not the time to train
larger numbers of air crews. And we cannot wait for the effects of strategic bombing
to be felt up here in the front lines. We must hit the Nazi's front lines and send
him back."
Novikov's aerial philosophy made a lot of sense, particularly in 1942, when even
the AAF and RAF high commands were prone to argue about the merits of strategic
bombing. There have been rumors for some time about the formation of something similar
to our Strategic Air Command. But the Reds will have to do a lot more than just
copy B-29's to bat in the same league with our expert SAC, whose crews are better
equipped and trained than any of the wartime AAF units. There is no room for complacency,
however. The planes have range enough to reach parts of America, and they can duplicate
the most important task ever assigned our Superfort - that of carrying the A-bomb
- as soon as they stockpile atomic bombs in the USSR.
It is entirely another story where the "falcons" of the Red Air Force fighter
outfits are concerned. Their combat pilots equaled or excelled - with inferior aircraft
- any during the war. There was a long roster of aces that included Pokryshkin (59
German planes), Rechkalov (44), Guliaev (36), Lavitsky (35), and Babek (33). It
was Savitski, with a 22-plane score, who flew the prototype YAK jet over Berlin
in several "experimental combat" flights in May and June, 1944, deliberately engaging
Luftwaffe jets. Now a Lieut. General and considered one of the most able Russ tacticians,
it is known that Savitski's findings have been incorporated in the combat texts
of the Moscow Aviation Institute. In the hands of pilots tutored by these aces and
others, the brood of excellent jet interceptors and frontier fighters may well be
able to form a formidable picket around vital targets in the USSR. Delivery of A-bombs
by an outside force may well prove a costly proposition on each and every attempt.
This is equally true because of the character and extent of guided missile activity,
where the German scientists are said to be more than earning their extra rations.
It is a well-known fact that if the Germans had gotten their V weapons and anti-air
missiles into production a little sooner, we might still be fighting. And it is
almost equally well known that-the German-Russian team is going on from the point
where V-E Day interrupted the imaginative German research.
We've heard a lot of controversy about the existence of a fabulous "Atomgrad"
- an atomic city roughly comparable to our Los Alamos Laboratory. A refugee scientist
now in the U.S. reported recently that such a city does exist near the Mongolian
border in Turkestan. The place is said to be under the immediate supervision of
the MVD secret police; and about two-thirds of Atomgrad's 400,000 population is
supposed to be either outright slave labor or folks in "protective" custody. In
fact, the leading Soviet atom expert, Dr. Peter Kapitza, is said to have been exiled
to Atomgrad for his failure to produce more quick results in his experiments.
They have been working a long time. The Soviets commenced atomic research in
1940, when intelligence discovered German progress in this endeavor Their first
large cyclotron was built in Kharkov but moved to Atomgrad in September, 1945. As
far as we know, their experiments to date have involved relatively weak bombs which
were developed under great difficulty; but they appear to be working intelligently.
Russian cosmic research is reputedly ahead of America's. The Reds were the first
to split atoms with cosmic rays about three years ago. They are also known to be
very active in-ionosphere research, and if they get anywhere at all, this can be
extremely dangerous.
Fortunately, America's high command is alert. We didn't know about the Japanese
Zero and Baka Bomb until these were thrust upon us. It cost a lot of Yanks their
lives to find out how to combat these weapons. But this time, we are finding out
some of the things we shall be up against if the Reds keep on misbehaving. And being
forewarned is being forearmed.
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